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elected need not be members of the Provincial Councils, although they should be eligible for such membership, suggests that it was not intended that the Federal Council members should be directly representative of the Provincial Councils.[1] Further, proportional representation was introduced in order to secure representation for the largest of the minority parties in all the Provinces.[2]

The Provinces could not therefore be represented in the Federal Council, as they were in the American Upper House, by corporate bodies of voters. Indeed, the provisions of Article 56, by which it was decreed that members should not be bound by instructions from any outside body, were expressly made to apply also to members of the Federal Council.[3] And these Articles, apart from the fact that they made impossible a strict representation of provincial interests, also constituted a very considerable interference by the State on what might well have been regarded as purely provincial matters.

The influence of the Federal Council on federal legislation was a limited one. It could submit bills to the National Council through the Federal Government,[4] and with certain important exceptions, as, for instance, measures dealing with financial matters, it had a right of suspensive veto. Bills thus vetoed could, however, be repassed by the National Council by a special majority.

It may be said, therefore, that the Federal Council was not organized on a strictly federal basis, and that its powers, as compared with those of the National Council, were extremely limited.

Those legislative powers not specifically enumerated as belonging to the State, were left to the Provinces.[5] Actually

[1] Article 35, (2).

[2] Article 35, (1), inserted at the instigation of the Social Democrats.

[3] Kelsen comments on this: 'Dass die Mitglieder des Bundesrates nicht an die Aufträge des Landtags gebunden sind, der sie entsendet, ist jedoch darum besonders bemerkenswert, weil es sich beim Bundesrat doch offenbar um eine Vertretung der Länderinteressen handelt. . . . Die Mitglieder des Bundesrates sind daher ebensowenig Vertreter des Landtages oder eines Landes, wie die Mitglieder des Nationalrates Vertreter des Bundesvolkes oder einzelner Wählergruppen sind.' (Op. cit., vol. v, p. 145.)

[4] Article 41, (1).

[5] Article 15, (1).

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642 635 however, the enumeration of powers belonging to the State covered a very wide range of subjects.

By Article 12 the Provinces had the right to provide supplementary legislation to general laws laid down by the State. If, however, the Provinces did not enact the necessary supplementary legislation within a given period of time, the State could pass the necessary legislation itself.[1] All provincial legislation required the sanction of the Government. Sanction could be refused on the grounds that the law in question endangered federal interests, and the provincial law could only be re-enacted with a special majority.[2] Even then, the case could be brought before the Constitutional Court by the Federal Government, on the grounds that the law in question was unconstitutional.[3] The consent of the State was necessary for any legislation requiring its co-operation.[4]

The legislative rights of the Provinces were therefore not extensive.

They were, however, far more richly endowed with administrative rights.[5] These were of two kinds: (*a*) direct administrative rights—i.e. in connection with administration dealing with exclusively provincial matters; (*b*) indirect administrative

[1] Article 15, (2). [2] Article 98, (2).

[3] But the Provinces could also challenge State laws on the ground of their unconstitutionality. Article 140, (1).

[4] Article 97, (2).

[5] The fourth section of the constitution, Articles 95–120, dealing with legislative and executive administration in the Provinces, required, however, to be implemented by three more laws before it could come into effect. The first of these, governing the financial relationship between the State and the Provinces, was passed on 3 March 1922 (B. G. Bl. Nr. 124). The second and third, dealing with administrative reform in the Provinces and with education, were never passed. Administrative power was divided between the State and the Provinces on the lines laid down by the Law of February 1861; legislative power was divided in accordance with the Law of 1867 (Articles 11 and 12); and educational facilities were provided in accordance with the Law of 1868. This delay was unfortunate in that it served to increase the already existing friction between the State and the Provinces by perpetuating uncertainty in their relationships; and legislation passed in the eighteen-sixties, the heyday of *laissez-faire* liberalism, could not meet adequately the needs of the new Austria. For instance, section 11 of the Law of 1867, enumerating matters to be dealt with by the State legislation, omits all reference to economic and social matters. Moreover, inadequate legislation could not, as it had been in the pre-war period, be implemented by Imperial ordinances.

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rights, i.e. administration in connection with federal legislation. It may be noted, however, that, even in connection with direct administrative rights, the State had a certain right to intervene. A Federal Minister could, for instance, challenge a provincial administrative act before the Administrative Court, on the grounds that the interests of the State had been injured thereby.[1] And any person could challenge any administrative act by bringing it before the Administrative Court, on the ground that it was *ultra vires*.

As regards provincial administration which supplemented federal legislation, the control of the State was considerable. And although it was intended to abolish as far as possible the old system of dual administration in the Provinces by using provincial officials for federal administration, it was expressly provided that, if the Provinces failed to implement federal legislation within a given length of time, the State might delegate the necessary administrative powers to its own officials. If supplementary administrative regulations were necessary in more than one Province, and the Provinces concerned could not reach an agreement, federal officials could be put in. Moreover, the Governor, the chief administrative official in the Provinces, although elected by the various Provincial Councils, was sworn in by the President.[2] And when local officials acted for the Federal Government they became, *ipso facto*, federal officials. Thus, the right of appeal against

[1] This was a new provision. In the old Austrian constitution only private persons could appeal against a decision before the Administrative Court. And this provision was the more important in view of the wide powers with which the Administrative Court was endowed. By Article 133, (3), for instance, it was empowered to decide cases on their merits, apart from legal considerations. This was a new departure, although Article 133, (1) and (2), had been taken over from the Laws of 1875. Kelsen comments as follows upon this Article: 'Die Möglichkeit einer Reformation von Verwaltungsakten durch den zentralen Verwaltungsgerichtshof ist um so bedeutungsvoller, wenn man berücksichtigt, dass es sich dabei auch um Verwaltungsakte handelt, die im selbständigen Wirkungsbereich des Landes gesetzt werden, u. dass deren Reformation durch ein Bundesgericht erfolgt.' (Kelsen, *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. xi, p. 263.) On the other hand, the Provinces had indirect control over the appointment of half the members of the Administrative Court (Article 135).

[2] Article 101, (4).

642 635 their actions lay through the central authorities and not through the Provincial Assemblies.

It may, therefore, be said that, although the Provinces were endowed with comparatively far-reaching administrative rights and duties, the State had extensive supervisory rights.

642 635 692 As regards judicial rights, Article 82 enunciates the principle that "The whole judicial system lies within the competence of the State".[1] It may, however, be noted that, although the Provinces had no influence over the election of the judges of the ordinary Courts, who were appointed on the advice of the Senates by the Federal Ministry and the President,[2] they had some control over appointments to the Administrative and Constitutional Courts. For instance, by Article 135, the nominations of the Federal Government for the posts of Vice-president, and half the members of the Administrative Court, required the assent of the Federal Council. Article 147 laid down somewhat similar provisions for appointments to the Constitutional Court.[3] But this case differed from the former in that the Federal Council had no influence over the appointment of the Vice-president.

It is clear, however, that the share of the Provinces in the working of the judiciary was even smaller than their share in legislation and administration.

642 635 But, while there can be no doubt that the substance of power lay with the State, lip-service was certainly freely paid to the federal idea. The outstanding example of this is Article 2, (1),[4] to which reference has already been made. Another example may be taken from Article 2, (2), where reference is made to the 'independence' of the Provinces. But, as Kelsen points out, this word has no exact legal meaning.[5] Article 15, (1), refers to cases not expressly made over to the State, as remaining within

[1] Kelsen comments on this: 'Dass die gesamte Gerichtsbarkeit dem Bund vorbehalten ist, bedeutet einen, für einen Bundesstaat ungewöhnlichen Grad von Zentralisation.' (Op. cit., vol. v, p. 176.)

[2] Article 86, (1).

[3] In this case, however, the Federal Council was responsible for the actual appointments. It did not merely give its assent to proposals of the Government.

[4] 'Österreich ist ein Bundesstaat.'

[5] Op. cit., vol. v, pp. 66–7.

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the sphere of provincial autonomy.[1] But, as the Federal State had in fact evolved from a unitary State, the word 'remain' is meaningless.

By Article 26, (2), it was laid down that the country should be divided up into constituencies within the various Provinces. Apart, however, from the fact that this constituted a recognition of the federal ideal, it is difficult to see that the Provinces derived any particular benefit from this arrangement. Article 36, providing for strict rotation among the Provinces in the office of President of the Federal Council, is of a similar character.

Article 24 announces that legislation shall be by the National Council, together with the Federal Council elected by the Provincial Councils. But in fact, as has been pointed out, the legislative power of the Federal Council was very slight indeed. The Federal Council had, for instance, no share in the appointing of the Government;[2] and it could not even set up special committees of investigation.[3]

Again, by the terms of Article 52, the Federal Council could, as the National Council, inquire into the conduct of the Government. It might be supposed that the corollary of this Article would be that, if the conduct of the Government was found to be unsatisfactory, the Federal Council could take some steps towards its removal. This, however, was not the case.[4]

There were, it is true, certain things which could not be done without the consent of the Federal Council. By Article 3, (2), for instance, it was decreed that no alterations could be made in the boundaries of the Provinces (except as provided by the Peace Treaties), except by agreement of all the Provinces concerned.[5] By Article 35, (4), it was decreed that no alteration

[1] 'Verbleibt sie im selbständigen Wirkungsbereich der Länder.' This terminology may be compared with that of the previous draft of this article, 'Die Länder . . . übertragen dem Bund', etc. The implication of these phrases is that the Provinces were originally sovereign bodies. This was certainly not the case. (Kelsen, op. cit., vol. v, p. 80.)

[2] Article 70. [3] Article 53, (1). [4] Article 74, (1).

[5] Cf. Weimar Constitution, Article 18, which empowers the State, in certain circumstances, to alter boundaries without the consent of the Provinces concerned.

should be made in the constitution of the Federal Council without its assent. And assent required a majority vote in favour from the representatives of at least four Provinces. A minority of the Provinces could thus prevent an amendment.[1] Finally, by Article 132, if a Province were involved in a dispute before the Administrative Court, the case had, as a rule, to be tried by a Senate having among its members a judge who formerly belonged to the judicial or administrative service of that Province.[2]

But although certain actions could not be carried through without the consent of the Provinces, effective precautions were taken to ensure that the Provinces should never become overpowerful.

Articles 95–120, for instance, gave the State control over the political and social structure of the Provinces. The provisions ensuring democratic government, safeguarding minority rights, and guaranteeing to the State extensive supervisory rights, guarded against the possibility of the growth of a strong, united opposition to the central Government from reactionary parties in the Provinces. The extent to which State control over the Provinces went may be seen by Article 100, which provided that a Provincial Council could be dissolved by the Government, if the consent of the Federal Council was obtained.[3] The Article provides an example of the spirit of compromise which pervades the Austrian constitution, for, while the federal principle is undermined by the provision that a Provincial Assembly can be dissolved by a State organ, it is safeguarded by the provision that the assent of the highest federal organ shall be necessary for such a dissolution.

The Administrative and the Constitutional Courts were clearly intended as State organs (although, as has been pointed

[1] The provisions of this article should have been applied also to Article 34 (dealing with representation of the Provinces in the *Bundresat*). Originally Articles 34 and 35 were one. When they were separated the constitutional committee omitted to make Article 35, (4), apply to both of them, though it was clearly far more important that it should apply to Article 34.

[2] Cf. with provisions for trying cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice (Statute of the Court, Article 31).

[3] The consenting vote, however, required a quorum of one-half of the members, and a two-thirds majority.

out, the Provinces exercised a certain indirect control over the appointment of their personnel). For instance, if a federal minister considered that the interests of the State had been injured by an erroneous decree of a provincial authority, he could bring the matter before the Administrative Court. No such provision, however, was made for appeals by provincial ministers against State decrees.[1]

Finally, the following provisions may be noted, which though not themselves of great importance, none the less indicate the general tendency to ignore the federal principle. By Article 41, (2), for instance, voters in three different Provinces could join in submitting an Initiative, provided that in each Province half of the qualified voters agreed to it. This was to be an alternative to an Initiative signed by two hundred thousand of the qualified voters in one Province, and was inter led to safeguard the rights of minorities in the smaller Provinces. It was clearly, however, an infringement of the federal principle.[2]

Finally, the formula used in the publication of laws is "The National Council has decided . . .", etc. (If the law is passed

[1] Article 129, (2). This may be compared with Article 140, (1), regulating appeals to the Constitutional Court. In this case the right of appeal is guaranteed both to the State and to the Provinces.

It may be noted that in the important sphere of finance, the control of the State was to be even further extended, by the Finance Constitutional Law of 3 March 1922 (B. G. Bl. Nr. 124). If a proposed provincial law dealing with financial matters was vetoed by the Federal Government, its re-passage by the Province concerned, with a special majority, did not settle the matter. 'In diesem Falle kann nämlich die Bundesregierung den Einspruch trotz des Wiederholungsbeschlusses aufrechterhalten. Der dadurch entstandene Konflikt zwischen Bundesregierung u. Landesgesetzgebung wird durch einen ständigen gemeinsamen Ausschuss des Nationalrates u. des Bundesrates entschieden. Dieser hat nämlich zu beschliessen, ob der Einspruch aufrecht zu bleiben hat, oder nicht. Entscheidet sich der Ausschuss für den Einspruch der Bundesregierung, erhält deren Veto einen absoluten Charakter.' (Kelsen, *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. xi, p. 258.)

[2] This article may be compared with Article 15, (3). In this case, the Provinces must co-operate in the passage of supplementary legislation under Articles 11 and 12. If they fail to do so, the right to pass such legislation is transferred to the federal minister. These two articles might seem to conflict with Article 107. But Article 107 is probably intended to prevent a combination of Provinces hostile to the central Government (cf. with Imperial Decree of 1860). Co-operation between the Provinces was not, on the whole, encouraged. By Article 107, for instance, Provincial Councils were forbidden to communicate with one another, except in matters falling within their autonomous sphere of action.

642 as the result of a Referendum this is noted.) No mention is
635 made of the co-operation of the Federal Council. Laws are
671 dated in the Federal Law Book from the day of their third reading by the National Council.

(iii) *The National Council*

642 The Austrian State was reorganized by the constitution of
646 1920 as a democratic, federal, and parliamentary republic. The pivot of the whole political structure was the National Council.

The sovereignty of the National Council was ensured by the almost complete absence of provisions for its control either by the people who elected it, the Federal Council, the Government, or the President.

From the first of these possible controlling bodies the National Council was virtually divorced after it had been elected. It was specifically laid down in Article 56 that members should not be bound by instructions. The people could, it is true, introduce legislation directly, by the device of the Initiative. They were not, however, encouraged to do so; the numbers of supporters required for an Initiative motion was, as has been pointed out, comparatively high; nor was the National Council bound to pass such bills. Similarly, proposals involving a complete revision of the federal constitution had to be submitted to a Referendum. But no attempt was made to define what was meant by a 'complete revision'; and again, it was not stated that the National Council was bound by the result of such a Referendum. Other measures only had to be submitted to a Referendum if the National Council so decided.[1] The National Council could only be dissolved before the end of its four-year term of office by its own decree. If it was so dissolved, it had to be reassembled by its President, if a quarter of its members so requested.[2]

But, if the National Council was not controlled by its electors, still less was it controlled by the Federal Council. The Federal Council had, as has been pointed out, in a few

[1] Article 43. [2] Article 28.

financial relationship of the State and the Provinces was passed on 3 March 1922,[1] it was found to be impossible to reach agreement on the other two proposed measures. The effects of the delay became increasingly serious, for the law of 1867, which was still in force as a temporary measure, restricted the legislative activity of the State to a minimum. This measure had been introduced in an era of economic liberalism, and it had already, by the end of the nineteenth century, been found necessary to disregard the limits set by it to State activity. Had these limits been rigidly adhered to, it would have been impossible, for instance, for the State to introduce any social legislation at all. But whereas before the war it had been possible to disregard the 1867 measure with comparative impunity, this was no longer the case in the post-war period, for, with the additional power given by the 1920 constitution to the Constitutional Court, it was always possible that one of the Provincial Governments would challenge even existing legislation as unconstitutional. And the overriding authority of the Emperor was no longer available for forcing through necessary measures. It was therefore considered advisable in 1925 to introduce the new provisions contained in Articles 10–15 of the 1920 constitution without further delay.[2]

Certain reforms were made in the existing system of provincial administration, which were intended to facilitate the working of the new administrative provisions and to prepare the way for a more comprehensive reform in the future. For instance, an attempt was made to end the dual administrative system. Since the war, both the provincial and the state officials (*Bezirkshauptmannschaften*) were indirectly under the control of the Provincial Governments,[3] the only difference being that in the latter case there existed a right of appeal to the Federal Government. Some doubt had, however, existed

[1] B. G. Bl. Nr. 124

[2] Certain minor changes of a centralist character were introduced at the same time, e.g. more control was accorded to the State in matters regarding water and electricity (B. G. Bl. 268, Article 10, x).

[3] For the Provincial Governments assumed, since the war, responsibility for the appointment of the Provincial Governors to whom the State officials were responsible.

642 635 regarding the status of those officials whose work was concerned with both indirect and State administration, and with provincial administration. Now they were all declared provincial officials, and a new official, the *Landesamtsdirektor*, appointed by the Provincial Government, with the approval of the Federal Government, was placed at the head of all the officials in each Province.[1] Traces of the old dual system remained, however, for the erstwhile State officials, although now responsible solely to provincial authorities, continued to enjoy their old status as State officials, and attempts to alter this somewhat anomalous state of affairs came to nothing, owing to opposition from two of the three parties of the Government coalition.

Certain minor reforms were introduced at the same time which were designed to strengthen the three control organs of the constitution.

The most important of these reforms was that by which some control over provincial finances was accorded to the Court of Audit.[2] The measure was disapproved of by the federalists, and was only passed under pressure from the League Commissioner. At the same time, the previous position, by which the Court of Audit had acted as a control on the Government, was in some measure reversed. This was also a result of pressure from the League Commissioner, who was anxious both to strengthen the position of the Government, since this body was as a rule ready to co-operate with him, and to induce the Court of Audit to co-operate in carrying through League reforms.

Another important provision passed at that time was that by which the State was accorded the right of absolute veto on provincial taxation for the period from 13 August 1925 to 31 December 1930. Again, the influence of the League Commissioner is clearly perceptible.

[1] B. G. Bl. 268, Article 106.

[2] B. G. Bl. 268, Article 127. Such control has been optional according to the terms of the 1920 constitution (Article 127), and only Burgenland had made use of it. The result had been that the Provincial Governments had been able to nullify the economies imposed by the League on the Federal Government. The Provinces were, however, induced to see reason at the *Länderkonferenz* of 1925.

sented by eighteen members, while thirty-six members should represent the professions and industries.[1] However, as Schober pointed out, a reform of such magnitude could not be hurried through in a few days—particularly as it would mean a further increase in the number of officials.[2] It was anticipated, however, that another constitutional law would be passed dealing with this matter. In the meantime the composition of the Federal Council remained unchanged.[3]

A further step towards centralization was taken by extending the control of the Court of Audit not only over provincial finances but over districts which comprised more than twenty thousand inhabitants.[4] Hitherto the control of the Court of Audit had only been exercised in those Provinces which had not independent control organs of their own.[5] This change brought the finances of the city of Vienna under the control of the Court of Audit, and in consequence was bitterly opposed by the Social Democrats.

The right of appeal in matters dealing with provincial administration was somewhat extended.

The powers of the State police were considerably extended at the expense of those of the Provinces.[6] As a result of this legislation, the special municipal police force instituted in Vienna after the 1927 riots had to be disbanded. All State police were to be given an autonomous ordinance right, in virtue of which they could, under special circumstances, issue ordinances, which would have temporary validity, provided

[1] *The Times*, 15 October 1929. [2] *Reichspost*, 20 October 1929.

[3] But although no new legislation was introduced, a later paragraph referred to members of the Upper House as enjoying immunity in their capacity as members of Provincial Councils (Article 58, (1)). But the old Federal Council members, although they had to be eligible for election, could not themselves be members of local assemblies (Article 35, (2), 1920).

[4] Smaller districts could be included if the Provincial Government concerned so requested (Article 127).

[5] B. G. Bl. Nr. 268, 30 July 1925, Article 127, (1).

[6] Kelsen, *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. xviii, p. 132. 'So gut wie die gesamte Sicherheitspolizei ist der Zuständigkeit der Länder entzogen, und dem Bunde übertragen. Diese Monopolisierung fast des gesamten Polizeiwesens beim Bund bedeutet, wenn man beachtet, dass auch das ganze Militärwesen u. die ganze Gerichtsbarkeit von allem Anfang an beim Bund lagen—einen Grad von Zentralisation, der mit dem Typus des Bundesstaates kaum mehr vereinbar ist.'

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642 625 that they did not contravene existing laws.[1] Schober gave an assurance that this legislation was only intended to endow the police with such additional facilities for keeping order as no law-abiding man could take exception to.

[871] The State Minister for Education was now given control over all matters concerning education[2]—a concession on the part of the Social Democrats.

642 635 The future position of Vienna was the subject of much bitter controversy. The Christian Socialists, seeing in its independence the key to many of the evils of post-war Austria, wished to deprive it of its provincial status, and reduce it to the position of a federal city under the direct control of the Federal Government. They maintained that it was not that Vienna was of lesser importance than the other Provinces, but that she was essentially different from them.[3] Her independent position as a Province could not, in their opinion, be reconciled with her special obligations as the capital city of the whole of Austria.[4] This, however, seemed to the Social Democrats like an attempt to have things both ways—federalism and the abolition of Viennese autonomy. But the Christian Socialists pointed out, with some truth, that the position of the Mayor of Vienna was very much stronger than that of an ordinary provincial Governor.[5] The Social Democrats argued, however, that it was ludicrous that the mayor of a city comprising two million persons should be reduced to the status of a mere *Bezirkshauptmann*, while a tiny province like Vorarlberg, comprising only 140,000 persons, should be in a position of

[1] Kelsen comments as follows on these provisions: 'Mit der Vorschrift, dass die von den Polizeibehörden zu erlassenden Verordnungen, nicht gegen bestehende Gesetze verstossen dürfen, stellt sich die Verfassung auf den Standpunkt der mehr als fragwürdigen Lehre, die zwischen Verordnungen secundum Legem, praeter Legem u. contra Legem unterscheidet.' (Op. cit., p. 143.)

[2] Article 120, (1); *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 5 December 1929.

[3] *Reichspost*, 12 October 1929.

[4] 'Der geschichtlich gewordene, legitime Länderföderalismus ist ein Wesen für sich, u. kann nicht verwechselt werden mit der Stellung der Bundeshauptstadt, die als solche besondere Verflichtungen gegenüber dem ganzen Bund, als Sitz aller zentralen Institute hat.' (*Reichspost*, 19 October 1929.)

[5] *Reichspost*, 19 October 1929.

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comparative independence.[1] According to the original proposals put forward by Schober in the form of three Bills, on 18 October, Vienna was deprived of its provincial status, and made directly dependent on the Federal Government. The powers of the Mayor were transferred to a Cabinet Minister, and the City Council reduced to twelve members.[2] These proposals could not, however, be carried, as the status of Vienna was an issue over which the Social Democrats were prepared to fight. And, in the end, Vienna retained its status as a Province. But a part of its revenue was in the future to be handed over to Lower Austria,[3] and a certain measure of control was accorded to the Federal Government regarding police, finance, and educational matters. And it was now possible to appeal to the Federal Government against decisions of the Mayor.

It may be noted that no provision was made by the new reforms for the existence of a 'State of Emergency', although this contingency had been provided for in the Weimar Constitution.[4] Kelsen draws attention, however, to the new provision of Article 102.[5] The intention of this passage is, Kelsen thinks, obscure. It may merely mean that measures normally within the competence of the local authority may be temporarily taken over by federal officials. It is not, however, expressly stated that the federal officials can only undertake matters which would be within the competence of the local authorities. Kelsen thinks it may be interpreted to mean that federal officials can, in such circumstances, take any measures which they may consider necessary to restore order. In this case, the provisions of the article do not seem to differ

[1] *Vorarlberger Volksblatt*, 19 October 1929.

[2] *Daily Telegraph*, 19 October 1929

[3] The German Nationalists had wanted the amalgamation of Vienna with Lower Austria. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 24 October 1929.)

[4] Article 48. Kelsen comments on this fact: 'Durch die Notverordnungen gemäss Art. 18 kann jedenfalls kein verfassungsmässig gewährleistetes Recht aufgehoben werden.' (*Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts*, vol. xviii, p. 144.)

[5] 'Ergibt sich in einzelnen Gemeinden die Notwendigkeit, wegen Gefährdung der öffentlichen Ruhe u. Ordnung, besondere Massnahmen zu treffen, so kann der zuständige Bundesminister mit diesen Massnahmen für die Dauer der Gefährdung eigene Bundesorgane betrauen.'

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of local feudal lords, special privileges which ensured it unusual opportunities for development.

The picture of a mediaeval townlet which Feldkirch presents today is furnished mainly by the streets of the inner town, consisting of solid and impressive buildings in which merchants have carried on their affairs for many generations. Such evidence as survives of former defensive constructions like the Churer Tor, the Katzenturm and Schattenburg Castle, which towers over the town, conjure up visions of scenes long past to attract a stranger's attention.

361 871 Feldkirch was called "Studierstädtlein" in bygone days when it was of great importance—one might almost say of unparalleled importance—in educational affairs. It had a grammar school, a college for teachers which attracted students from all over the country, and the famous Jesuit college "Stella Matutina", well-known throughout Europe.

361 635 It could with almost equal justice have been called the "Township of Bureaucrats", although it was never a centre of government. But the majority of the other administrative bodies of the province are established in Feldkirch. The cosmopolitan character of the bureaucracy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has affected the racial composition of the local population.

361 498 Feldkirch, as a junction on the only direct East-West route, is of importance to the Austrian traffic system. It is the main railway station on the frontiers of Austria with Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and thus a connecting-link in the West European transport organization.

133 DO YOU KNOW THE LEGEND OF THE THREE SISTERS? No? Then wander from Feldkirch through the Ill Ravine, the "Felsenau", that deep channel which the river has for centuries been cutting through the imprisoning rocks and which is still so narrow that there is only just room for the railway leading to the Walgau to run beside it. A feat of engineering was called for to carry the road over river and railway on a precarious bridge. Once one emerges from this narrow gorge, the character of the countryside is seen to have completely changed. Even the air is cooler, and the natives say that east of the Felsenau (i. e. in Walgau) it is "a jacket cooler" than in the Rhine Valley. You walk all